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FINTECH’S DOUBLE EDGES
CHRISTOPHER G. BRADLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The pace of change in financial technologies has quickened due to the 
rapid advances in technology from the late 1990s through today, exempli-
fied by the advance of handheld devices and applications and the perva-
siveness of the Internet in every facet of commerce. New financial 
technologies—commonly identified by the portmanteau “FinTech” or 
“fintech”—have already reshaped many commercial practices that affect 
businesses and consumers, and they are likely to change many more.1
The increasing availability and sophistication of FinTech offers both 
promises and perils. Artificial intelligence-driven algorithms purport to 
improve access to credit on “objective” criteria but may sometimes rein-
force longstanding discriminatory race and class barriers2; online financial 
services may ease immediate access to banking and credit and to infor-
mation about price and quality of products, but may also make it easier to 
saddle oneself with a lemon in an impulse buy; credit reports requested 
instantaneously online may make it easier to monitor or correct such rec-
ords, but may lead to reports being used in more contexts to bar individuals 
with spotty or non-existent credit histories from holding jobs or from par-
ticipating fully in important aspects of mainstream financial, political, or 
social life. In other words, a FinTech tool may benefit some set of business 
or consumer interests and then, applied later or in a different context, 
threaten those same interests; a tool that harms some group may then lead 
to development of a tool that favors them.
The point of this essay is not the well-worn one that technology can be 
misused, or that it can have a “dark side.” Rather the point is that, as this 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. Responses welcomed at cgbrad-
ley@uky.edu. The author would like to express appreciation for the counsel of Michael Livermore, 
Patricia Lee, Andrew Woods, Matthew Bruckner, Carla Reyes, Franklin Runge, Matthew Swinehart, 
Brian Frye, the participants in the Junior Scholars Virtual Colloquium and the SEALS 2017 New 
Scholars workshop, and the editors of the Chicago-Kent Law Review. The author is also grateful for the 
research assistance of Kaylie Raber and Hannah Witherspoon.
1. For a recent survey of FinTech, see generally George Walker, Financial Technology Law—A
New Beginning and a New Future, 50 INT’L LAW. 137 (2017).
2. See, e.g., Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big 
Data, 93 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3 (2017).
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essay terms it, FinTech tools have “double edges”: the same technological 
tool may be used in different ways and have different effects, particularly 
on consumers—and each tool may lead to the development of a new tool 
that yields yet more sets of ultimate uses and effects. In other words, the 
development of financial technological tools is unpredictable and path-
dependent, contingent both on technological developments as well as the 
social contexts in which tools are developed and used.
The double edges of FinTech tools—the dynamic, unstable, and path-
dependent nature of their development and use—present a keen legal prob-
lem, a problem of regulatory balance and responsiveness. The double-
edged nature of FinTech is an important but unappreciated structural fea-
ture of it. This essay examines the “double-edged” nature of financial tech-
nologies with a focus on consumer transactions, and explores some 
implications of it.
The essay unfolds as follows. Part II provides several examples of fi-
nancial technologies and their double edges—how they present hidden or 
undiscovered benefits and risks, and develop based on emerging social 
contexts as well as advancing technological capabilities, in a manner that is 
unpredictable ex ante.3
Part III argues that from the perspective of public policy generally or 
consumer protection in particular, FinTech can neither be fully embraced as 
friend nor restricted as foe. Rather, it must be regulated carefully and in 
light of various competing goals, including fostering innovation, policing 
abuse, and protecting access to markets, to financial services, and to justice. 
This essay cautiously endorses regulatory “sandboxes” and other tools of 
experimentalist and participatory governance; purposive, standards-based, 
and compliance-driven regulation; and the promotion of the development 
of consumer-protective FinTech. 
Part IV calls attention the issues of distributive justice and equity that 
arise when the financial or cognitive barriers to effective use of FinTech 
may be prohibitive. In other words, it argues that differential access to 
FinTech may implicate important issues of access to justice.
3. Examples of the unpredictability of commercially successful technological developments are 
easy to come by. See, e.g., David Pogue, Use It Better: The Worst Tech Predictions of All Time, SCI.
AM. (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/pogue-all-time-worst-tech-predictions/ 
[https://perma.cc/S67M-B76M] (collecting poor predictions by prominent and knowledgeable figures 
dating back more than a century, and including his own poor prediction, from 2006, the year before the 
introduction of the iPhone: “Everyone’s always asking me when Apple will come out with a cell phone. 
My answer is, ‘Probably never.’”). 
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II. FINTECH’S DOUBLE EDGES
Many FinTech tools undoubtedly have lowered transaction costs and 
yielded societal benefit—in other words, have borne benefits for all, with-
out “favoring” any particular set of interests or having a distributive effect 
benefiting one or the other of the typical “players” in a transaction. Imag-
ine, for instance, technical standard improvements or chip design advance-
ments, or simply the communications and information technology 
advancements that permitted the widespread installation of Automated 
Teller Machines (ATMs), which cut transactions costs and provide benefits 
to both merchants and consumers.4
Other FinTech tools may have other effects that are less neutral: for 
instance, FinTech tools might help merchants and hurt consumers, or vice 
versa. It is this latter set of tools that this essay largely focuses on.
This Part argues that a major structural feature of FinTech is its dou-
ble-edged nature—in other words, that it presents an ex ante unpredictable 
set of benefits and risks to those using it in their commercial interactions, 
and that any given FinTech development may be followed by future devel-
opments that are equally double-edged and unpredictable. The first section 
below provides the extended example of the FinTech company Lend-
ingTree, and then the second section generalizes the observation to numer-
ous other aspects of FinTech. The third section below explains and defends 
the breadth of the definition of “FinTech” adopted in this essay.
A. The Example of LendingTree
LendingTree provides a prime example of a FinTech double edge. 
LendingTree is an online platform that connects consumers with providers 
of loans.5 The bulk of its business is in mortgage loans.6 Would-be borrow-
4. See, e.g., M. Mitchell Waldrop, The Chips are Down for Moore’s Law, 530 NATURE 144 
(2016), 
https://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.19338!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/530144a.pd
f [https://perma.cc/S46B-JNJ6] (charting rise in transistors per computer chip and clock speeds and 
explaining importance of this rise for computing); Open Internet Standards, INTERNET SOC’Y,
https://www.internetsociety.org/what-we-do/internet-technology-matters/open-internet-standards 
[https://perma.cc/MRG7-D3PF] (explaining in general terms the purpose of Internet standards and the 
organizations that develop open Internet standards); Bernardo Batiz-Lazo, How the ATM Revolutionized 
the Banking Business, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 27, 2013, 11:23 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-03-27/how-the-atm-revolutionized-the-banking-
business [https://perma.cc/5YRG-LATD] (surveying history); MASSIMO PROVERBIO ET AL.,
ACCENTURE, ATM BENCHMARKING STUDY 2016 AND INDUSTRY REPORT (2016),
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-10/Accenture-Banking-ATM-Benchmarking-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TKV2-HKGS].
5. It offers other financial services too, such as credit score access and financial education, but 
both its advertising and its financials make clear that its primary purpose of facilitating lending. See
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ers fill out a form regarding relevant characteristics such as credit and em-
ployment history and the sort of loan they are seeking. Within minutes after 
receiving this information, LendingTree’s comparison shopping tool pro-
vides quotes from lenders, with key terms presented in charts for easy eval-
uation. It also provides borrowers with information, such as customer 
reviews, about the lenders. In other words, LendingTree provides a self-
described “marketplace,” where loans come to resemble, at least at the 
initial stage,7 other products for which a consumer might shop or research 
on the Internet.
Borrowers are not charged a fee for the service.8 Instead, more than 
450 lenders “partner” with LendingTree, paying for their quotes to be pro-
vided to customers, for potential customer information to be provided to 
them, and for click- or telephone-traffic ultimately to be routed to them 
from LendingTree’s web or phone interface.9
LendingTree is “just” a platform and does not provide loans itself. But 
the platform business is very big business. LendingTree is a public compa-
ny with a market capitalization just under $2.7 billion as of August 2017.10
In 2016, LendingTree’s mortgage loan-related revenue was almost $220 
million, and it employed almost 400 individuals.11 Following a common 
playbook in the current technology field, it has acquired related start-ups in 
order to expand and diversify its business. For example, it recently acquired 
LendingTree, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/TREE/5031337209x0x933532/0E7283E5-FF24-4A31-A19C-
0D489F641C3B/SEC-TREE-10-K_-_1434621-17-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE2E-VW8E].
6. Id. at 4.
7. The instant quotes received are conditional only. Terms of Use Agreement, LENDINGTREE,
https://www.lendingtree.com/legal/terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/5PEG-YDDY] (repeatedly referring 
to loan offers as “conditional”); LendingTree, Inc., supra note 5, at 5. Mortgage loans, to take the most 
common example, are subject to numerous layers of state and federal regulation, and thus the initial 
ease of the loan process may be followed by a more traditional process of underwriting and agreement.
8. The lack of upfront costs for the borrowers, while important to understanding LendingTree’s 
business model, is of course no guarantee that the service is truly costless, either financially or from a 
privacy perspective, but the question is one that will be considered further below. LendingTree’s terms 
of use imply that some lenders pass the marketing fee through directly to consumers: “Depending on 
the Lender, the marketing match fee is paid by the Lender and may be included in your rate, points or 
loan terms. LendingTree strongly encourages and requests such fees not be passed onto you; however, it 
is without the authority to enforce the same.” Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 7.
9. LendingTree, Inc., supra note 5, at 3–4 (explaining revenue model). See, e.g., Terms of Use 
Agreement, supra note 7 (repeatedly making clear that request for quotes includes consent to email and 
phone contact by lenders).
10. LendingTree Inc., GOOGLE FIN., https://www.google.com/finance?q=NASDAQ:TREE 
[https://perma.cc/PEX4-V975].
11. LendingTree, Inc., supra note 5, at 4, 8.
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a provider of comparable “marketplace” services for comparing credit card 
terms, CompareCards, for over $100 million.12
In addition, LendingTree has sought to transform casual, one-off users 
into long-term customers by offering an ongoing monitoring and advice 
service, “My LendingTree,” which regularly checks and analyzes infor-
mation such as personal credit history and property valuation data, and 
updates customers with new offers when terms better than their initial ones 
become available—for instance, when LendingTree’s algorithms think it 
might be a “good time” for a customer to “tap the equity” in a home.13 The 
service also comes in “app” form for smart phones and tablets, and adver-
tises the availability of quick personal loans: “Money 24/7—Access to 
Virtually Any Loan You Need Is Just a Few Taps Away.”14 This pivot 
from “mere” platform into comprehensive service provider mirrors similar 
moves by other major technology companies, for instance, Amazon.com 
with its club-like, ever-expanding “Prime” program. It also mirrors efforts 
at cross-selling by financial institutions such as Wells Fargo, which pro-
voked legal trouble by pressuring its employees to foist unneeded, addi-
tional accounts and services on existing customers.15
12. Id. at 55–57. CompareCards is a d/b/a for Iron Horse Holdings LLC, which was the actual 
acquisition target. The transaction was $80.7 million in cash and earnouts ranging up to $45 million, 
estimated for valuation purposes at $23.1 million. Id.
13. Id. at 5.
14. My LendingTree, APPLE ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/my-lendingtree-credit-score-
report-alerts/id957868548?mt=8 [https://perma.cc/E5RE-JKBZ].
15. Jesse Hamilton, Wells Fargo Is Fined $185 Million over Unapproved Accounts, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 8, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-08/wells-fargo-fined-
185-million-over-unwanted-customer-accounts [https://perma.cc/N5TR-JYG8] (noting that according 
to the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau’s allegations, Wells Fargo “opened more than 2 million 
accounts that consumers may not have known about”); Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Review Finds 1.4 
Million More Suspect Accounts, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-accounts.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/4BWF-KSXC]; Chris Arnold, Who Snatched My Car? Wells Fargo Did, NPR (Aug.
2, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/08/02/541182948/who-snatched-my-car-wells-fargo-did 
[https://perma.cc/B58X-ND8H] (noting that Wells Fargo enrolled approximately 490,000 auto loan 
customers for unneeded and duplicative auto insurance, leading to many defaults and repossessions of 
cars); Matt Levine, Wells Fargo Opened a Couple Million Fake Accounts, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Sept. 9, 
2016, 5:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-09/wells-fargo-opened-a-couple-
million-fake-accounts [https://perma.cc/AZJ5-GBHC] (explaining and examining why Wells Fargo’s 
would be so aggressive about “emphasiz[ing] cross-selling of multiple ‘solutions’ [i.e., products] to 
customers.”); Hendrik Laubscher, Building Loyalty: What We Can Learn from Amazon Prime,
SKUBANA (May 29, 2017), https://www.skubana.com/amazon-prime-building-loyality-selling-
strategies/ [https://perma.cc/G7YM-ZVV2] (noting numerous advantages of Amazon’s Prime program 
for building customer loyalty and undermining competitors); Tom Popomaronis, The Inexorable Rise of 
Amazon: Nine Reasons Why It’ll Only Get Bigger, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2017, 10:05 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tompopomaronis/2017/08/04/jeff-bezos-amazon/#4e7ffc165c16 
[https://perma.cc/758Z-EC9X] (noting that “[c]onsumers turn to Amazon for . . . everything,” and that 
events such as “Prime Day” have built a loyal customer base); Emma Hinchliffe, Why Amazon Keeps 
Adding More Benefits to Prime, MASHABLE (Oct. 14, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/10/14/amazon-
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Although the functions that are now commonly performed on Lend-
ingTree’s web page or app would have been unthinkable for consumers 
twenty years ago (which is roughly when LendingTree was founded, in 
1998), the core technologies are no longer cutting edge as a technological 
matter. But now they have been embraced by a broad public.16 The breadth 
and sensitivity of the information transmitted and the highly regulated na-
ture of the industry present technological challenges distinct from many 
other online marketplaces outside of the FinTech arena (such as those for 
normal household goods). Data security, regulatory, and privacy issues are 
major risks (and subjects of regulation by the FTC17) that require techno-
logically influenced responses. In addition, the rise of “Big Data” brings 
the promise of more accurate and informed underwriting but requires sig-
nificant technological investment; the technological demands for those 
competing in this and other data-driven business sectors seem likely to 
increase dramatically in complexity in coming years.18
Platforms like LendingTree are an important form of FinTech, for 
which there was obviously significant pent-up demand, judging by their 
success. No wonder that consumers find an appeal in the relative transpar-
ency of LendingTree, in light of the opacity with which the traditional lend-
ing market has generally operated.19 The convenience of receiving 
prime-benefits/#snXSlW8MFEqI [https://perma.cc/LLY6-W84Q] (reporting on research that “Prime 
members buy more on Amazon. More specifically, they spend two-and-a-half times as much on Ama-
zon as customers who don’t have Prime.”); Laura Stevens & Heather Haddon, Big Prize in Amazon–
Whole Foods Deal: Data, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-
prize-in-amazon-whole-foods-deal-data-1497951004 [https://perma.cc/6EUF-UXAJ] (explaining that 
one rationale for a recent merger is that “[a] Morgan Stanley survey shows about 62% of Whole Foods 
shoppers are members of Amazon’s Prime service, opening the door for cross-sell promotions to entice 
customers who shop at both to spend more”).
16. Seeking to protect its (apparently only) two patents, LendingTree engaged in litigation against 
several competitors including Zillow, but was largely unsuccessful. LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 
54 F. Supp. 3d 444 (W.D.N.C. 2014). Its business of course relies on numerous other licenses, trade 
secrets, and so on, many of which are technologically sophisticated.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2015).
18. See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR 
INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 1, 16 (2011), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/big-data-the-next-frontier-for-innovation
[https://perma.cc/TR74-TAZN]; Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Marketplace Lending,
ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2949456 
[https://perma.cc/GD5J-9YRL]; Bruckner, supra note 2.
19. Zach Carter, Elizabeth Warren Launches Mortgage Forms Regulatory Overhaul,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2011, 5:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/18/elizabeth-
warren-launches_n_863773.html [https://perma.cc/X6X4-KL4D] (“The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau advanced its overhaul of annoying, incomprehensible mortgage forms on Wednesday . . . .”);
BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 82 (2010) (“[A]s everyone in the mortgage business knew, increased disclosure had 
done virtually nothing to stamp out lender abuses. Over the years, there had been numerous disclosure 
requirements added to the law. Yet to the average home buyer, mortgage documents remained largely 
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numerous quotes without having to visit any “brick-and-mortar” establish-
ments is significant. The model also fosters competition, such that even if 
potential lenders might not have name recognition (much less any physical 
presence) in a given region, customers can now find them.20 In addition, 
the experience of online comparison and selection of a loan may compare 
favorably to the experience, for instance, of trying to assess loans and of-
fers while in a car dealership. Such tools may remove some of the leverage 
from merchants who are thought to commonly use their control over the 
sales environment to pressure consumers to make poor decisions.21 In sum, 
this technology lowers transactions costs, allows for convenient compari-
son shopping among at least some number of options,22 and provides con-
sumers with powerful tools to use in their commercial transactions.23 These 
incomprehensible.”). Even official resources produced by government officials trying to help consum-
ers understand and navigate the process reflect the completely overwhelming nature of the task. See,
e.g., Consumer Information: Shopping for a Mortgage, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0189-shopping-mortgage [https://perma.cc/7LV3-WK75] [here-
inafter Consumer Information] (providing an overview of the numerous components of a mortgage 
broker quotation); FED. TRADE COMM’N, MORTGAGE SHOPPING WORKSHEET,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0104-mortgage-shopping-worksheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TQB8-QQUY] (providing a worksheet with spaces to fill in forty-seven separate 
possible terms from each mortgage quote, to supposedly allow comparison shopping); CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU, YOUR HOME LOAN TOOLKIT (2015) 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_your-home-loan-toolkit-web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W6V3-MB5K] (providing 28-page booklet on understanding mortgage loan terms and 
process).
20. Several of the highest rated firms on a recent list of LendingTree’s “top rated” lenders are far 
from household names. See Press Release, Megan Greuling, LendingTree, LendingTree Announces Top 
Customer-Rated Lenders by Loan Product for Q1 2017 (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.lendingtree.com/press-release/top-customer-rated-lenders-q1-2017
[https://perma.cc/8DMW-L43L] (listing “Insight Loans” as top in the mortgage category, Refijet in the 
auto loans category, and Seek Capital in the business loans category).
21. Neal E. Boudette, A Smartphone App to Relieve Your Car-Buying Agony, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/automobiles/wheels/a-smartphone-app-to-relieve-
your-car-buying-agony.html?mcubz=3&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/356Y-QPWK]; Mary M. Chapman, 
Online Upstarts Seek to Disrupt Used-Car Buying, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/automobiles/wheels/online-used-car-sales.html?mcubz=3 
[https://perma.cc/JJ8B-ESUV] (“Speaking of conventional car dealerships, [a user of the online compet-
itor] said: ‘I always think they’re going to swindle you. . . . It’s a very overwhelming situation, and you 
feel like you have to be on top of things and on guard.”).
22. Rory Van Loo has noted, concerning online shopping for consumer goods, that “[t]here is 
little doubt that technologies have enabled consumers to acquire information about products more easily 
and to purchase more conveniently, and online retailers have increased price pressure on brick-and-
mortar retailers and thus in some instances moved markets closer to competitive pricing.” Rory Van 
Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1328 
(2015). He goes on to note several ways in which online comparison shopping remains difficult or 
impossible. See, e.g., id. at 1329–31; id. at 1334 (“Consumers . . . have gained helpful search technolo-
gies, but they have major limitations and the empirical literature consistently finds that sellers control 
these interfaces to exploit consumer decisionmaking limits.”).
23. See Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation—From 
Facts to Data, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 169, 177 (2017) (“Big data benefits not only industry and researchers, 
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are likely the reasons that in addition to for-profit market participants like 
LendingTree, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has developed 
some basic tools of its own to accomplish some of these goals outside of 
the for-profit realm.24
However, the implications of the widespread use of LendingTree’s 
technology are mixed from a consumer perspective. Consumer advocates 
reacted negatively to a 2016 Super Bowl commercial for mortgage giant 
Quicken’s “Rocket Mortgage” app, which raised the prospect of applying 
for a home mortgage from a smart phone, and depicted a theater full of 
eager consumers each apparently embarking upon a highly complicated and 
important financial course of action more or less on a whim.25 Loan terms 
(particularly for high-dollar items like homes) often remain highly compli-
cated,26 and even if all required disclosures are made, near-instantaneous 
loan agreements are not an unalloyed good if they lead to ill-considered 
“impulse buys.” Even aside from the merits of the loan decision itself, the 
information conveyed in the course of a loan application is highly sensitive 
and may be difficult to preserve on such an interface.27 And again, even 
assuming LendingTree’s disclosures and terms are completely accurate, it 
is an open question if consumers understand what they are signing up for 
(or if they can afford the products they might be sold).
On LendingTree’s platform, consumer information is likely to be con-
veyed to a number of different lenders, who may pull credit reports, contact 
consumers, keep or analyze (and potentially lose or abuse) their personal 
data, and so on.28 Consumers may not understand how LendingTree itself 
but it also increases consumer choice through publicly available websites providing big data analyses 
intended to support consumers’ decision-making processes.”).
24. See Know Before You Owe: Mortgages, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/know-before-you-owe/ [https://perma.cc/8RG8-EMQT].
25. See, e.g., Emily Badger, Everything That’s Wrong with the Super Bowl’s Worst Ad, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/08/everything-thats-wrong-with-the-super-
bowls-worst-ad/?utm_term=.8a9faefd6287 [https://perma.cc/DEY9-H8QK]. The one-minute commer-
cial may be viewed on YouTube. Ad Bowl 2016, Rocket Mortgage Super Bowl Ad 2016 Quicken 
Loans, YOUTUBE (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nXW2BJixXfw 
[https://perma.cc/W5Y6-W8QD]. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau apparently “sub-tweeted” 
(i.e., responded critically but indirectly to) the ad shortly after it aired: “When it comes to #mortgages, 
take your time, ask questions and #knowbeforeyouowe.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@CFPB), 
TWITTER (Feb. 7, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/696491147708002308 
[https://perma.cc/JZ4Y-M8VX].
26. See Consumer Information, supra note 19.
27. See, e.g., What Documents Are Part of the Mortgage Process?, U.S. BANK,
https://www.usbank.com/home-loans/mortgage/mortgage-process.aspx [https://perma.cc/3LPS-MJZL] 
(listing, among other things, extensive tax, bank, and employment documents that will be required).
28. See, e.g., Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 7 (“When you complete an inquiry form 
online, by clicking on any button indicating an acceptance, acknowledgement or agreement to terms, a 
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is compensated; for instance, customers may be unaware that the “uni-
verse” of lenders is limited to “partners” of LendingTree and that Lend-
ingTree is being paid to generate leads and to have borrowers “click 
through” to potential lenders.29 In addition, consumers may not understand
the degree to which LendingTree—similarly to other “platforms”—will try 
to limit its liability if something goes wrong in the transaction and the con-
sumer becomes aggrieved.30 The various terms of the initial (“conditional”) 
loan quotes may be subject to manipulation without consumers understand-
ing the salience of important details.31 Even the arrangement of the quotes 
on the page could conceivably be subject to manipulation by LendingTree 
without consumers being aware of it; for instance, could a “partner” pay 
LendingTree to list it first whenever possible, by initially sorting loan re-
sults by whatever loan characteristic on which that lender might offer a 
continuance of processing or submission (‘submission’) you understand that you are consenting, ac-
knowledging and agreeing to the stated terms and conditions of that submission and that you are sub-
mitting an inquiry as to a lending product through LendingTree which will match you to up to six (6) 
Lenders to whom your loan request and personal information is transmitted.”).
29. Id. (“LendingTree does not guarantee that the loan terms or rates offered and made available 
by Lenders are the best terms or lowest rates available in the market. LendingTree’s Network of Lend-
ers is vast, but does not represent all potential Lenders in your area.”).
30. Id. (listing extensive disclaimers of reliability and waivers including for software attacks or 
other errors; requiring customer to broadly indemnify LendingTree; noting limitation of damages; and 
disclaiming any liability for links to third-party websites). Furthermore, as is common with such terms 
of use, LendingTree reserves the right to change them at any time, “effective immediately upon post-
ing” on its web page, after which any use of the website “shall be deemed to constitute acceptance of 
such changes”; which of course makes it all but impossible to actually know what is being consented to 
if one has to use the LendingTree website regularly.
31. See LendingTree, Inc., supra note 5, at 5 (describing offers as “conditional”); Terms of Use 
Agreement, supra note 7 (“The rates and fees actually provided by Lenders may be higher or lower 
depending on your complete credit profile, collateral/property considerations . . . and value and in-
come/asset consideration . . . . Unless expressly stated in writing, nothing contained herein shall consti-
tute an offer or promise for a loan commitment or interest rate lock-in agreement.”). Even moving from 
a conditional to a firm quote may require a payment by the lender. See id. (“A Lender you select may 
require you to pay an application or other fee to cover the costs of an appraisal, credit report or other 
items.”). The strategy described here would comport with behavioral economic explanations of disad-
vantageous subprime mortgages becoming commonplace leading up to the financial crisis. See Oren 
Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1073, 1079 (2009) (“A similar argument [based on behavioral economics] explains the complexity of 
subprime mortgage contracts. Imperfectly rational borrowers will not be able to effectively aggregate 
multiple price and nonprice dimensions and discern from them the true total cost of the mortgage 
product. Inevitably, these borrowers will focus on a few salient dimensions. If borrowers cannot process 
complex, multidimensional contracts and thus ignore less salient price dimensions, then lenders will 
offer complex, multidimensional contracts, shifting much of the loan’s cost to the less salient dimen-
sions.”).
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preferable term?32 Finally, LendingTree’s prominence and influence over 
the lending market could have anticompetitive effects.33
Evaluating LendingTree’s overall effect for consumers is obviously a 
complex task, and would require adjustment based on the company’s 
changing business practices as well as consumer expectations and behav-
iors (How many consumers shop around, versus taking the first quote they 
receive, for mortgage financing? Are consumers becoming more careful 
about Internet security concerns and/or savvy about the need to compare 
among multiple Internet “marketplaces”?). As became widely known in the 
aftermath of the economic collapse of 2007–2008, the residential lending 
market outside of LendingTree is hardly exemplary.34 But it should be 
clear, at a minimum, that there is a double edge at work—both significant 
benefits and significant risks for consumers using LendingTree’s platform. 
Further, it would have been difficult or impossible to predict—even ten 
years ago—that people would feel comfortable seeking a loan through, and 
submit a huge amount of sensitive financial information to, such an inter-
face, and that the personal information and leads generated from such a 
platform could lead it to be valued in the billions of dollars. Technological-
ly, perhaps, the challenge would not have seemed insurmountable—but to 
combine the technological capacity with the requisite degree of acceptance 
among both businesses (lenders) and consumers (borrowers) would surely 
have been hard to predict, implausible at best. LendingTree’s success 
builds on numerous prior technologies (such as eBay’s) that were each, in 
turn, successful at garnering acceptance and that then became components 
of this new, lucrative platform.
B. Other Double Edges
Other examples of FinTech’s double edges are easy to come by. The 
double edges are everywhere, and represent in fact a structural feature of 
32. See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1293 n.142 (2017) 
(noting the vagueness of LendingTree’s statements about its practices); id. at 1291 (discussing similar 
“choice architecture” concerns). 
33. Rory Van Loo has provided a trenchant critique of the anticompetitiveness of the practices of 
major technology firms. See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of 
FinTech, 65 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Van Loo, supra note 32, at 1293–96 (discussing 
anticompetitive outcomes resulting from “excessive intermediation” by technological tools).
34. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Econom-
ics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1337–57 (2002); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking 
and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707 (2006); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant 
with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1083 (1984). 
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FinTech that should be expected to persist. The double edges can be illus-
trated by reference to several emerging technological and social aspects of 
FinTech tools:
? Information is easier to promulgate, share, connect, and up-
date using technological means.
Technological changes and the widespread embrace of financial tech-
nologies have facilitated the promulgation, sharing, connecting, and updat-
ing of information. Financial transaction information readily available 
electronically could include, for instance, “terms of service” from mer-
chants, or credit card or bank records from financial intermediaries and 
institutions (for instance, images of cancelled checks). The cost savings of 
being able to provide documents electronically could be significant; and, in 
theory, electronic disclosures will give consumers ready (not to mention 
searchable and easily-stored) access to important, binding terms of their 
transactions, all more securely than through U.S. mail.35 Also, communica-
tions technology and the ready availability and relative transparency of data 
may permit consumers to put a stop on credit cards, to track banking and 
credit transactions, and even to monitor their credit reports and correct 
them.36 These tools again save transaction costs and provide powerful tools 
to consumers.
On the other hand, these tools raise some new concerns as well. Pure 
disclosure-based regimes are widely viewed as being unsuccessful at actu-
ally informing consumers and correcting for their bounded rationality.37
Thus, allowing for a greater and cheaper volume of disclosure without any 
concern for quality may actually impair consumer decisionmaking. It might 
35. See CHI CHI WU & LAUREN SANDERS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PAPER STATEMENTS:
AN IMPORTANT CONSUMER PROTECTION 1, 10 (2016), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/banking_and_payment_systems/paper-statements-banking-
protections.pdf [http://perma.cc/A2WC-MDWJ] (“Unfortunately, some financial institutions are ag-
gressively pushing consumers into electronic statements, using tactics that are questionable and argua-
bly illegal. Financial institutions have an incentive to convert consumers into electronic statements to 
save on the costs of printing and postage.”); DELOITTE, IS IT TIME TO GO PAPERLESS? RECORDS 
MANAGEMENT: THE COST OF WAREHOUSING BAD HABITS 1, 3 (2012), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/financial-
services/ZA_ItsTimeToGoPaperless_24042014.pdf [http://perma.cc/89JC-LNC3] (emphasizing ex-
pense of records management). Among other laws, the “E-Sign Act” permits the use of electronic 
records. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–7006, 7021, 
7031 (2015); 21 C.F.R. pt. 11 (2017) (implementing regulations).
36. See KATHERINE M. PORTER, MODERN CONSUMER LAW 124 (2016) (collecting evidence and 
sources); Richard M. Hynes, “Maximum Possible Accuracy” in Credit Reports, 80 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 87, 92–97 (2017) (analyzing economic effects of mistakes on credit reports).
37. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 176 (2014); Van Loo, supra note 32, at 1276–77, 1288–89. It 
is reported that the average set of disclosures for a checking account stretch to more than 100 pages. See
PORTER, supra note 36, at 395.
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also facilitate merchants adjusting terms at their convenience and at practi-
cally no expense, resting comfortably in the knowledge that consumer 
backlash to such changes (or even awareness of such changes) is highly 
unlikely. In addition, there is evidence that consumers who receive elec-
tronic records may review them less than paper records.38 And there re-
mains a significant “digital divide” separating those with easy access to 
technology and those without—including vulnerable populations such as 
the poor or elderly.39
Another type of potentially consumer-favoring information could be 
the technologically aided collection, organization, and publicization of 
feedback and evaluation concerning counterparties in commercial transac-
tions. The social media platforms have come to form in many ways a realm 
where consumers have aggregated significant power to themselves—
complaints “going viral on social media” and making significant impact is 
a new and important tool that functions to protect consumers. Along similar 
lines, technology may also enable regulators, researchers, and consumer 
advocates to gather and analyze data on abuses in areas where poor or non-
existent data has prevented enforcement of consumer-protective laws.40
On the other hand, “free” email, social media, and related services 
such as Google’s or Facebook’s have curtailed consumer privacy and secu-
rity interests by feeding immense amounts of personal information into the 
machine of “Big Data,” which can integrate information across platforms 
and across different aspects of consumers’ lives and promulgate it. This 
opens consumers to new vulnerabilities ranging from to identity theft, to 
closely targeted advertising and fine-grained price discrimination.41 Thus, 
38. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET 133–36 (2015), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201512_cfpb_report-the-consumer-credit-card-market.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3E8E-MTZ7] (noting that those who opt out of paper disclosures “are for the most 
part opting out of reviewing their statements entirely,” thus making them “less likely to identify any 
erroneous or fraudulent transactions,” or to “encounter standard mandatory statement disclosures, such 
as the minimum payment warning” required by 12 C.F.R. § 1026.7(b)(12) (2017)).
39. This is a protection on which consumer advocates have maintained an emphasis. See WU &
SANDERS, supra note 35, at 2–6 (describing effect of “digital divide” and statistics concerning the 
communities commonly lacking dependable digital access).
40. This is the case with respect to misleading advertisements, see PORTER, supra note 36, at 83; 
see also Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer Protection, 80 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 177 (2017) (discussing CFPB’s tracking of consumer financial com-
plaints).
41. See supra note 18; Antonio Garcia Martinez, Facebook’s Not Listening Through Your Phone. 
It Doesn’t Have To, WIRED (Nov. 10, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks-
listening-smartphone-microphone/ [http://perma.cc/WCJ4-R3RQ] (“Remember, Facebook can find you 
on whatever device you’ve ever checked Facebook on. It can exploit everything that retailers know 
about you, and even sometimes track your in-store, cash-only purchases; that loyalty discount card is 
tied to a phone number or email for a reason. . . . Facebook copied the concept of ‘data onboarding’ 
from the greater ad tech world, which in turn drafted off of decades of direct-mail consumer marketing. 
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these innovations may provide efficiencies but may also be poorly under-
stood by affected consumers—shifting the dynamics of commercial rela-
tionships in ways that they may be poorly positioned to adjust to—or have 
undesirable distributive effects. 
? Technologically sophisticated means of identification such as 
biometrics are now available and can be implemented inex-
pensively.
Biometrics technologies—such as the fingerprint readers and facial 
recognition tools used as identity verification on numerous “smart” devic-
es—have become widespread and relatively inexpensive.42 They are prom-
ising technologies for protection of financial transactions and relationships. 
Such tools are being integrated into the financial system to help make fi-
nancial transactions more secure and address the major problem of identity 
theft.43
On the other hand, these same tools present major privacy and security 
challenges.44 Unlike user names or passwords, biometric identifiers, if sto-
It’s hard to escape the modern Advertising Industrial Complex.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A
TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-
understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WWL-97BJ]; Mitch Lipka, Rise in 
Identity Fraud Tied to Smartphone Use, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2012, 9:50 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-idtheft-javelin/rise-in-identity-fraud-tied-to-smartphone-use-
idUSTRE81L16520120222 [https://perma.cc/5PN2-KP7V]. Rory Van Loo has offered a detailed 
compendium and analysis of data analysis and other strategies used by sophisticated online sellers of 
goods. Van Loo, supra note 22. Big Data also makes “skip-tracing,” that is, the locating of debtors who 
have defaulted on some debt, much easier. Experian claims, with respect to its skip-tracing records, 
“[m]ore than 1.3 billion updates are made per month.” Experian, of course, also produces credit reports 
for consumers. What Makes Experian’s Skip Tracing Tools Better?, EXPERIAN,
http://www.experian.com/small-business/skip-tracing-tools-software.jsp [https://perma.cc/72TF-B3PC].
42. “Touch ID” and “Face ID” are Apple, Inc., terms for this increasingly widespread technology. 
See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, We Tried Really Hard to Beat Face ID—and Failed (So Far), WIRED (Nov. 
3, 2017, 7:00 AM) https://www.wired.com/story/tried-to-beat-face-id-and-failed-so-far/ 
[http://perma.cc/68GL-9F6P] (discussing these technologies and their limitations). On the expense of 
the systems, see Press Release, Parv Sharma, Counterpoint Tech. Mkt. Research, More Than One 
Billion Smartphones with Fingerprint Sensors Will Be Shipped in 2018, (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.counterpointresearch.com/more-than-one-billion-smartphones-with-fingerprint-sensors-
will-be-shipped-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/4E7R-YCZY] (predicting extensive use of fingerprint bio-
metric security in “low-mid end smartphones” due in part to declining costs).
43. See, e.g., Rachel Chang et al., Macau’s ATMs Are Using Facial Recognition to Help Follow 
the Money, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
06-28/macau-atms-need-face-time-before-payout-to-help-follow-the-money [https://perma.cc/HH7N-
DF5J]; Daniel R. Stoller, Banks Bet Big on Biometrics as N.Y. Cybersecurity Rules Loom, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.bna.com/banks-bet-big-b57982083603/ [https://perma.cc/GU5K-
2CUG]; PORTER, supra note 36, at 104.
44. See, e.g., Yana Welinder, Biometrics in Banking Is Not Secure, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR 
DEBATE (July 13, 2016, 1:14 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/05/biometrics-
and-banking/biometrics-in-banking-is-not-secure?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/4HNL-ZMUE]; Claire 
Gartland, Biometrics Are a Grave Threat to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (July 5, 2016, 
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len or accidentally made publicly available, might be useless for the rest of 
a person’s life for security purposes. Furthermore, biometric information 
might convey more information than just that needed for security—for 
instance, information about health and well-being that could then threaten 
privacy or security outside of the context of mere identity verification.45
? Big data, artificial intelligence, and machine-learning tools 
such as IBM’s Watson are available and can be implemented 
in common financial transactions.
Much has been made of the promise of artificial intelligence, includ-
ing through use of sophisticated “deep learning” approaches such as those 
developed by IBM’s Watson project, to lower transaction costs of everyday 
financial transactions, and to do much more than that: to evaluate credit 
risks more accurately,46 and even to provide tailored financial advice (via 
“robo-advisors”).47 The idea is that with many new types and massively 
greater amounts of information fed into machines capable of analyzing the 
data, patterns will emerge and complex problems will be more readily 
solvable at prices accessible to everyday investors, borrowers, and financial 
institutions. These tools promise, among other things, to lower the cost of 
credit and increase access to credit for the “unbanked” and for others cur-
rently lacking access to the mainstream financial system.48 The claim is 
that superior range of data and superior data-processing tools allow for
much finer-grained analysis of actual creditworthiness. Purportedly, com-
panies deploying these high-tech tools can underwrite much more cheaply 
and efficiently,49 or provide more objectively sound, well-supported, and 
cheap investment advice.
On the other hand, as repeated, massive breaches have shown,50 data
is hardly safe when it is in the hand of merchants, and putting massive 
3:21 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/05/biometrics-and-banking/biometrics-
are-a-grave-threat-to-privacy?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/99H7-VRYE].
45. See, e.g., Editorial, Biometric Security Poses Huge Privacy Risks: Without Explicit Safe-
guards, Your Personal Biometric Data are Destined for a Government Database, SCI. AM. (Jan. 1, 
2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/biometric-security-poses-huge-privacy-risks/ 
[https://perma.cc/4MBD-5VGY].
46. See Odinet, supra note 18; Bruckner, supra note 2.
47. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisers
Rescue the Retail Market?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97 (2017).
48. See Bruckner, supra note 2.
49. See Odinet, supra note 18, for a balanced treatment of lenders relying on these tools.
50. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Anthem is Warning Consumers About its Huge Data Breach. 
Here’s a Translation, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015, 10:34 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
mh-anthem-is-warning-consumers-20150306-column.html [http://perma.cc/8485-PBWQ] (describing 
Anthem’s security breach affecting “as many as 80 million Americans”); Michael Adams, Why the 
OPM Hack Is Far Worse Than You Imagine, LAWFARE (Mar. 11, 2016, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-opm-hack-far-worse-you-imagine [https://perma.cc/4SMG-N9U2] 
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amounts of new data into the financial system makes that system even 
more of a target than it already is. Breaches are of particular concern when 
the data is highly sensitive, as with health data—or financial data—both of 
which would be involved in developing and using the A.I. and machine-
learning systems under discussion. Cheap credit and better investment ad-
vice might be bought at the price of loss of privacy and increased risk of 
identity theft.
Reliance on artificial intelligence, machine learning, and algorithms 
rather than human judgment can introduce new forms of dysfunction within 
the financial system as well. Individuals may mistakenly believe these tools 
can be followed uncritically, and therefore pay little attention to their limi-
tations. Whereas investment advice or credit decisions from a human can 
be questioned, a “deep learning algorithm” may not make its decisions in 
any way that can be usefully conveyed to a user. This lack of transparency 
isn’t, of course, always a problem, when the decisions are good and the 
system is functioning as it is supposed to. But once users are lulled into 
complacency they may fail to monitor the system’s decisions and may lose 
the capacity to catch mistakes.
Finally, these “A.I.” or algorithmically driven tools may in part be 
more profitable because they provide a way of evading important regulato-
ry regimes that drive up compliance costs in conventional lending—
including important regimes prohibiting discrimination on unlawful ba-
ses.51 In other words, the appeal of these tools may derive in part from reg-
ulatory arbitrage.52
This analysis is necessarily at a high degree of generality. As with 
other tools, these tools may of course be a net benefit to users and to socie-
ty, or they may not; the answer will depend on the ways that specific tools 
are used, and the ways that they develop over time. The point of this analy-
sis is that from the outset, and indeed at every point along the way, it will 
(discussing breach of U.S. Office of Personnel Management database and describing it as “the greatest 
theft of sensitive personnel data in history”).
51. Odinet, supra note 18; Bruckner, supra note 2.
52. Regulatory arbitrage is a convenient concept, but it bears noting that scholars have wrestled 
with whether to characterize this type of activity as truly “regulatory arbitrage” or some related but 
distinct phenomenon. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 
S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 397 n.61 (2017) (distinguishing between regulatory arbitrage and the term “regula-
tory entrepreneurship,” coined by the authors); Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies 
and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 293, 327 (2016) (“Notably, when these services take regulatory shortcuts, it is difficult to 
know whether the services gain traction through genuine excellence and efficiency, or through regulato-
ry arbitrage.”).
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not be possible to determine whether the next round of tools and uses will 
provide more benefits or harms.
? Due to the broad availability of credit-related data and the 
development “back-end” tools that simplify transaction tech-
nicalities, transactions can be completed much more quickly 
and easily than before.
Most delays in financial transactions serve no helpful purpose. They 
simply drive up costs and force delays. All parties benefit if transactions 
are settled speedily and reliably, so that participants don’t have to rely on 
alternative sources of finance that may be less advantageous, or face other 
consequences of a preferred transaction not taking place due to needless 
delay. As technologically sophisticated tools to analyze credit and process 
transactions have become commonplace, transactions that used to take days 
can be completed in moments.53
On the other hand, ready credit is not an unalloyed good when behav-
ioral or psychological factors are taken into account.54 Technologically 
enabled speed can hurt consumers, if the speed encourages bad decisions or 
provides inadequate time to make decisions. Regulatory arbitrage may 
again play a role in spurring the use of certain technologies if part of the 
allure of these technological tools is to evade regulations such as required 
“cooling-off periods.”55
While numerous other examples could be given,56 the examples given 
in the preceding pages should illustrate how double-edged FinTech tools 
are. They can promote efficiency but can also enable manipulation and 
rent-seeking. And importantly, FinTech’s double edges, as explored in the 
preceding two sections, develop based on technological changes as well as 
those involving social and political context; note the effect of popular be-
havior in giving social media such a powerful effect, as well as the effect of 
regulation in determining how tools are developed. This is not simply a 
technological story—it is a social, cultural, and political one as well.
Also, the development of FinTech is path dependent but highly com-
plex; each later step builds on what came before but not in any predictable 
53. See, e.g., RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF 
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 9–44 (2006).
54. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 1373 (2004).
55. See, e.g., PORTER, supra note 36, at 402 (noting that certain mobile payments lack the con-
sumer protections for unauthorized transactions and the cooling-off period provisions of most other 
transactions).
56. For instance, crowd-funding and “peer-to-peer lending,” which open up the sources of financ-
ing but also present risks to the “peers” on both sides of the transactions, see, e.g., PORTER, supra note
36, at 573, or insurance companies, which could refine rates based on more detailed customer infor-
mation, but may also compromise privacy. 
2018 FINTECH’S DOUBLE EDGES 77
way. From any given time to the next, an assessment of the effect of a giv-
en technological tool on consumers, merchants, or their transactions might 
shift significantly. This fluidity is part of what distinguishes policymaking 
in areas where technological transformation is particularly prominent, and 
FinTech is no exception.
C. What Exactly Is FinTech? Does It Have a Limit?
The sections above demonstrate the broad applicability of the concept 
of “FinTech’s double edges,” but also may raise the question: What is the 
limit of “FinTech”? Are there any financial transactions that are not, at this 
point, “FinTech-enabled” transactions?
This essay defines FinTech broadly: FinTech includes any tool or ap-
plication that relies in any significant part on advanced technology to per-
form a role significantly related to financial transactions.
FinTech can be divided into several types. First is FinTech that allows 
for more efficient information gathering and monitoring. This would in-
clude, for instance, tools that provide communications, credit reports, bank 
records, prices, or rates; online banking applications provided by major 
banks,57 online credit reports,58 and services such as LendingTree’s (as 
discussed above).59 Another type of FinTech is tools of contracting and 
commerce. These support the depositing of check on a smartphone, or the 
use of PayPal to make an online payment. Hundreds of millions of con-
sumers have clicked such agreements and have contracted for transactions 
with Apple or Amazon.60 Finally, there are enforcement and dispute resolu-
tion tools. Online dispute resolution tools are increasingly common and fall 
57. Graham Rapier, These Are the Banks with the Best Apps, According to Consumers, BUS.
INSIDER (June 13, 2017, 2:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/consumers-say-these-banks-have-
the-best-apps-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/8H59-7NBE] (citing data that 31% of customers use mobile 
banking applications).
58. See ANNUALCREDITREPORT.COM, https://www.annualcreditreport.com/index.action 
[https://perma.cc/2FLT-UN63] (“The only source for your free credit reports. Authorized by Federal 
law.”); Credit Reports and Scores, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/category-credit-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/6XV5-F4LS]; 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a) (2015) (guaranteeing right to free credit report every 
year); 12 C.F.R. pt. 1022 (2017).
59. See supra Section I.A.
60. Amazon is estimated to have at least sixty-three million members of its “Prime” service 
worldwide. See Eugene Kim, Amazon Just Shared New Numbers That Give a Clue About How Many 
Prime Members It Has, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2017, 5:11 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-gives-clue-number-of-prime-users-2017-2
[https://perma.cc/JXR7-A8WH]. Apple is estimated to have more than 500 million users of its services. 
See Kif Leswing, Investors are Overlooking Apple’s Next $50 Billion Business, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 4, 
2016, 2:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-suisse-estimates-588-million-apple-users-2016-
4 [https://perma.cc/X7XB-JUCL].
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into this category; eBay has a prominent program of that type.61 Another
example is starter interrupter devices, which permit lenders to remotely 
freeze a car in the driveway if a buyer defaults on her car payments.62 The 
devices also have a beacon that allows the creditor to locate and repossess 
the immobilized vehicle. Such a device might not intuitively be included as 
FinTech, but it arguably is, because it involves very sophisticated technol-
ogy allowing much easier enforcement of security interests in collateral 
than the old-school repo man.63
A broad definition seems important because of the pervasiveness of 
technology in the underlying foundations of all of these examples. Even 
“traditional loan underwriting” now involves the consideration a vast array 
of data beyond what would have been traditional in the sense of Bailey 
Building & Loan in It’s a Wonderful Life.64 And the money that will ulti-
mately be loaned flows from far more complex sources and through far 
more complex vehicles than either George Bailey or Mr. Potter would have
thought possible. All of this was enabled by technology.
On some level, adopting such a broad definition means that it includes 
virtually all finance tools, and that virtually all financial activity can be 
characterized as involving Fintech. Dramatic changes in technology seem 
unlikely to have left any corner of finance untouched in significant ways. 
Some aspects of finance are more “FinTechy” than others; it’s a matter of 
degree not kind.65
This essay advocates adopting a broad conception of FinTech, particu-
larly in the consumer arena, for reasons that have little to do with techno-
logical development per se and more to do with society and with policy. 
61. See eBay-Style Online Courts Could Resolve Smaller Claims, BBC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31483099 [https://perma.cc/S9CF-XR5F]; Anjanette H. Raymond & 
Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers: Dispute Resolution in the Crowd, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 357, 374 (2015).
62. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Electronic Issues in Secured Financing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 285, 297–303 (John A. Rothchild ed., 2016) (surveying and critiqu-
ing current commercial law implications of this type of device); Erica N. Sweeting, Comment, Disa-
bling Disabling Devices: Adopting Parameters for Addressing a Predatory Auto Lending Technique on 
Subprime Borrowers, 59 HOWARD L.J. 817 (2016) (arguing for stricter regulations of such devices).
63. Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Miss a Payment? Good Luck Moving That Car,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 24, 2014, 9:33 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/miss-a-
payment-good-luck-moving-that-car/ [https://perma.cc/69Q5-NPPW] (“The devices are reshaping how 
people like Mr. Vead [head of collections at a lender institution] collect on debts. He can quickly locate 
the collateral without relying on a repo man to hunt down delinquent borrowers. Gone are the days 
when Mr. Vead, a debt collector for nearly 20 years, had to hire someone to scour neighborhoods for 
cars belonging to delinquent borrowers.”).
64. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
65. Big Data may be similar in this respect. Bruckner, supra note 2, at 7 (“Big Data is like any 
other source of data plus the 3V’s (volume, variety, and velocity).”).
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Consumer protection involves the interaction of law, social norms, finan-
cial and market structures, as well as (of course) evolving technological 
possibilities. Generally speaking, “technological revolutions do not get 
interesting socially until they are boring technologically.”66 A technologi-
cal change may take years or decades to affect these other elements in a
sufficiently significant way for its effect to be observable. What is now 
known as “Big Data” is actually only a further step in a decades-long pro-
cess of increasing availability to merchants of ever more fine-grained in-
formation about consumers, assets, and transactions; it has played a part in 
the rise of numerous tools that can be reasonably classified as FinTech, 
including credit cards, electronic payment, derivatives, and securitization.67
In addition, a change in technology that does not directly affect the fi-
nancial world may have a large impact on it. For instance, social media is 
an important FinTech tool, as it has permitted consumers to work together 
to exchange information and exert influence collectively in situations 
66. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 47 (2014) (quoting Clay Shirky, Talk at June 2009 TED@State Conference: 
How Social Media Can Make History, 
http://www.ted.com/talks/clay_shirky_how_cellphones_twitter_facebook_can_make_history/transcript 
[https://perma.cc/YM9V-KVAC]), 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=wlulr-online
[https://perma.cc/P6ZL-N7ZX].
67. Robert Shiller has provided several lengthy and historically contextualized explanations of the 
modern financial landscape. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 39–69 (3d 
ed. 2016); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004). See
also DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA: HOW FINANCIAL MODELS SHAPE MARKETS 
(2008) (providing history of theoretical innovations of modern financial markets, most of which rely in 
application upon computing power only available in the last decades of the twentieth century); Andrea 
Ryan et al., A Brief Postwar History of U.S. Consumer Finance, 85 BUS. HIST. REV. 461, 465 (2011). 
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where individual action would have been impracticable at best,68 and has 
also become a potential tool for lenders to evaluate creditworthiness.69
The argument of this Part has been that while these FinTech tools 
have collectively—without a doubt—lowered commercial transaction costs 
and brought social benefit, some of them also have complex distributive 
effects—they make life easier in particular for lenders, or for merchants, or 
for consumers, in ways that are unpredictable ex ante and that are depend-
ent on prior technological or socio-cultural developments. What to do about 
these facts is the subject of the remainder of the essay.
III. FOSTERING FINTECH WHILE PROMOTING CONSUMER 
PROTECTION
From the perspective of consumer protection, FinTech can neither be 
fully embraced as friend nor restricted as foe. Rather, it must be regulated 
carefully and in light of various competing goals, including fostering inno-
vation, policing abuse, and protecting access to markets, access to financial 
services, and access to justice.
There is a real danger of over-regulation of FinTech. While as noted in 
the preceding Part, FinTech yields benefits for society and for consumers, 
those benefits may be slow to emerge or difficult to discern at any given 
state of time and technology; FinTech’s progress is unpredictable and path-
dependent.70 If this is true, then over-regulation risks unknowingly quelling 
future benefits.
68. Financial institutions have invested in providing customer service over social media, and 
seeking to monitor reputational risks. See, e.g., Mary Wisniewski, Wells Fargo Sets Up War Room to 
Monitor Social Media Sites, AM. BANKER (Mar. 27, 2014, 3:52 PM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/wells-fargo-sets-up-war-room-to-monitor-social-media-sites 
[https://perma.cc/X74T-L4P6].
Social media firestorms against perceived corporate misdeeds have become commonplace. 
United Airlines changed its policies and took other actions after a recording, made on a smart phone, of 
a passenger being torn off a plane was widely viewed on social media. See Julie Creswell & Sapna 
Maheshwari, United Grapples with PR Crisis over Videos of Man Being Dragged Off Airplane, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/business/united-airline-passenger-
overbooked-flights.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/TM8W-W9KJ]. Although he undertook numerous 
other activities that damaged his reputation, Martin Shkreli initially became infamous for dramatically 
raising the prices of certain important medicines and then defending the action in ways that quickly 
drew public scorn. Eric Owles, The Making of Martin Shkreli as ‘Pharma Bro,’ N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (June 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/business/dealbook/martin-shkreli-
pharma-bro-drug-prices.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/895W-FQEW] (“His sneering defenses of the 
price increase led to a social media firestorm (and federal and state investigations) . . . .”).
69. The startup Lenddo uses “non-traditional data derived from a customer’s social data and 
online behavior,” to produce a “Lenddo score” to be used in credit evaluation. Our Products, LENDDO,
https://www.lenddo.com/products.html#creditscore [https://perma.cc/A7TK-JNAC].
70. This is a particular risk if benefits to consumers are reasonably well distributed, in other 
words if the problems of inequitable access to FinTech discussed in Part IV below are successfully 
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One could object that even in light of the beneficial aspects of 
FinTech’s double edges, its risks to consumers outweigh the benefits to 
them, and therefore regulation should be pursued regardless of its effect 
upon future innovation or the consumer benefits yielded. But while innova-
tions may generally tend to be developed by merchants (who are repeat-
players and are well-funded), it is far from clear that such innovations will 
be a net loss to consumers. As noted, major transaction cost savings have 
already been harnessed and more can be expected.71 Also, in light of tech-
nology’s capacity to make aggregate consumer activity cheaper for instance 
by virtue of coordination on social networking/social media (overcoming 
one of the major historical barriers to consumer protection), the pro-
consumer benefits to FinTech are far from illusory.72 For these reasons, the 
extreme version of this objection is unlikely to be true.73 In addition, be-
cause FinTech’s advance seems unlikely to be stopped, it seems necessary 
in any case to consider how to regulate in a way most likely to yield con-
sumer benefits and protect against harms.
addressed. In that case, the costs of over-regulation (in the form of benefits denied to consumers) will 
be borne by a very broad swath of consumers.
71. See Warren, supra note 4.
72. For an influential and optimistic articulation of these ideas in the popular press, see CLAY 
SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008).
Class action lawsuits, although they continue to be subjected to fierce critiques, are the tradi-
tional and most formal mechanism for overcoming the coordination difficulties that prevent effective 
vindication of small-scale rights. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red 
Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 912 (2016) (“Class actions empower 
plaintiffs; that is what we used to think. Aggregation levels the field, the theory goes, by creating econ-
omies of scale, by permitting investment based on aggregate stakes, and by offering leverage in settle-
ment negotiations.”); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, U.S. Agency Moves to Allow Class-
Action Lawsuits Against Financial Firms, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/business/dealbook/class-action-lawsuits-finance-
banks.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/DD77-E7ET] (“[O]ne federal judge remarked in an opinion that 
‘only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.’ By banning class actions, companies essentially squashed 
challenges to practices such as predatory lending, wage theft, sexual discrimination and medical mal-
practice.”).
Commentators have recognized that coordinated efforts on social media may serve a parallel 
or complementary function to class actions, empowering consumers who may not have claims worth 
pursuing on their own. See Jeremy R. McClane, Class Action in the Age of Twitter: A Dispute Systems 
Approach, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213, 242 (2014) (“Technology also facilitates coordination by 
allowing for easier multidirectional communication and information flow, potentially enabling collec-
tive action even where the cost is high.”); Casie Collignon & Paul Karlsgodt, Class Actions 101: A New 
“Viral” Class Action?, AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/classactions/articles/fall2012-1112-class-actions-101-
new-viral-class-action.html [https://perma.cc/PU7V-777H].
73. In any case, whether it is true is beyond the scope of this paper; in a related project, I am 
working on ways in which the interaction of technological change and consumer protection can be 
modeled, which may yield some insight into the question. Christopher G. Bradley, Technological 
Change and the Consumer Protection Arms Race (Working Paper No. [  ], 2017) (on file with author).
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This essay cautiously endorses several strategies for approaching 
FinTech as a matter of consumer protection policy: purposive and compli-
ance-driven regulation; regulatory “sandboxes” and other experimentalist 
approaches to FinTech governance; and the development of consumer-
protective FinTech.
FinTech in this context is currently regulated by a patchwork of state 
and federal laws and regulation. This includes, for instance, the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Truth in Lend-
ing Act, state deceptive trade practices acts, and even Article 9 of the UCC, 
which has consumer protective provisions.74 Legal institutions are also part 
of the landscape, since they give teeth to the existing laws. Federally, the 
main regulators are the FTC and the CFPB among others, and of course 
state attorneys general play important parts, and public interest organiza-
tions.75
But traditional regulations and regulatory institutions may be too slow 
and inflexible to successfully regulate FinTech, at least on their own.76
74. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692a-1692p (2015); Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681a to 1681c, 1861c-1–1681c-3, 1681d–1681s, 1681s-1, 
1681s-2, 1681t–1681x (2015); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 16 C.F.R. pt. 602 
(2016); Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2015)); Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (2017); Con-
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1–505/1(2007)); 
Consumer Protection Act, 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of KY REV.
STAT. 367.110–367.360 (2017)); PORTER, supra note 36, at 32–45 (outlining consumer protective 
laws). On the Uniform Commercial Code, see U.C.C. § 9-320(b) (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2010) (protecting buyers of consumer goods); § 9-102(a)(20)(C) (carving out consumer goods 
from definition of consignment); § 9-620(a)(3) (prohibiting strict foreclosure of consumer goods if they 
are in possession of the consumer); § 9-620(e) (providing conditions for mandatory disposition of 
consumer goods); § 9-620(g) (prohibiting partial strict foreclosure with respect to consumer transac-
tions); § 9-625 (providing for statutory damages in consumer cases); § 9-626(b) (leaving in place 
common-law rules with respect to deficiencies in non-complying sales in consumer transactions); 
Marion W. Benfield Jr., Consumer Provisions in Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1255 (1999) 
(discussing consumer-related revisions to U.C.C., most of which survive in current Code); Edward L. 
Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
11 (1997) (same). In addition, numerous provisions of the U.C.C. are also overridden by federal con-
sumer law. See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss, The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code Process in an 
Increasingly International World, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 354 (2007) (collecting examples).
75. Peppet notes the broad definition of consumer report within the statute, and that: “The FTC 
has warned mobile-application developers that if they provide information to employers about an 
individual’s criminal history, for example, they may be providing consumer reports and thus regulated 
by the FCRA.” Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 126–27 (2014).
76. There is a burgeoning literature on regulation of technology. For some important recent 
literature, see Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 23, at 168–74, 180–90; Elizabeth Pollman, Rise of Regu-
latory Affairs in Innovative Startups, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED 
STATES (D. Gordon Smith & Christine Hurt eds.) (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880818 [http://perma.cc/P8G8-SSEY]; Chris 
Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977 (2015) (noting 
that disruptive financial technologies will require new regulatory approaches); Douglas W. Arner et al., 
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Command and control-type regulations may often be inappropriate when 
the goal is to stimulate or at least permit innovation, and outright regulatory 
prohibitions may inhibit technologies that will reduce transaction costs and 
lead to beneficial innovations; in other words, many traditional regulations 
may not only be slow but also innovation-dampening.77 Thus this essay 
proposes some different regulatory strategies below for dealing with 
FinTech’s double edges.
A. Purposive, Standards-Based Regulation and a Focus on Internal 
Compliance Norms
Conventional wisdom in the consumer protection arena is that “bright-
line” laws tend to be better for consumers. This is because they will be 
under-provided with legal services and lack sufficient financial incentives 
to pursue claims reliant on complex legal theories or factual determina-
tions, including concerning damages.78
This conventional wisdom might have to cede some ground, at least 
temporarily, with respect to FinTech. While the considerations underlying 
the conventional wisdom remain important, clear and specific laws may not 
be possible when technology is changing rapidly and when its application 
provides sufficient flexibility to evade narrowly drawn, bright-line rules. 
Faced with a concern over legal obsolescence given the speed of change 
and technologically enabled evasion of legal standards,79 a turn to more 
FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371 
(2017); Jeremy Kidd, FinTech: Antidote to Rent-Seeking?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 165 (2017); Van Loo, 
supra note 32; Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175 (2014).
77. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 76, at 189 (discussing some challenges inherent in developing a 
regulatory policy that will “allow agencies to oversee the formative years of an industry without suffo-
cating it”).
78. See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 
2b And 9 Be Fair To Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 124–27 (1997) (explaining that “bona fide 
error” defenses run counter to consumer interests because “statutory damages serve not only a deter-
rence function, but they also provide a simple, low-cost substitute to expensive litigation, which re-
quires time consuming questions about the amount and scope of actual damages”); Anne Fleming, The 
Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 1383 (2014) (presenting 
research, including archival research, concerning how unconscionability doctrine served consumers in 
part by provoking lawmakers to provide bright-line statutory remedies); Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: 
A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in Commercial Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549 (1997) (“[E]xperience 
provides overwhelming support for the use of specific rules and enhanced remedies, including public 
enforcement, in the consumer context.”).
79. Advertisers recently sought to exploit a loophole in existing “do not call” laws to force 
voicemails onto phones that the advertisers would not be able to call directly. This is an excellent 
example of a new technologies for gaining the attention of consumers that might be within the spirit but 
not the letter of the existing law. See Tara Siegel Bernard, No, Your Phone Didn’t Ring. So Why Voice 
Mail From a Telemarketer?, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/business/phone-ringless-voicemail-fcc-telemarketer.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/23SK-T5A5].
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purposive, standards-based legislation may be appropriate. A potential 
approach would be to orient regulations explicitly toward goals or purposes
in regulations,80 so the rules can remain applicable as the particular forms 
of risk or abuse change—in other words, to avoid forcing legislators or 
regulators into a game of “whack-a-mole” that they are likely to lose.81
Current “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices” (UDAAP) laws 
already include some aspects of a more standards-based approach in addi-
tion to statutory damages and other more traditional provisions, but the 
laws could be developed much further to serve these purposive ends.82
While this format has weaknesses, it may be the lesser of two evils when 
the speed and flexibility of technology is so centrally involved in the regu-
lated entities and practices.
Along these same lines, purposive laws could expressly require that 
companies put into place internal procedures and policies to address major 
policy concerns that their business models raise—in other words could 
require companies to invest in compliance. Startups developing FinTech 
tools might not have formed any “firm culture,” and a “nudge” toward 
paying at least some attention to compliance might help form such a culture 
and prevent obvious abuses. Required compliance policies might include 
mandatory consideration of discriminatory impact of technologies, or of 
security risks with respect to personally identifiable information. Although 
some companies may take an Uber-like approach of “better to ask for-
giveness than permission” to regulation no matter how clearly articulated it 
is,83 many companies will try to comply with reasonable guidelines particu-
larly if the consumer protective purpose is readily apparent or clearly artic-
ulated.84
80. See Brummer, supra note 76, at 1039–42 (discussing “[t]he Attractiveness (and Limitations) 
of Objectives-Based Regulation”).
81. PORTER, supra note 36, at 171 (lauding the “flexibility” of UDAAP statutes because other-
wise you leave legislatures to play “whack-a-mole”).
82. They have been subject to complaint on grounds that they subject industry to too much risk 
because the broad, purposive regulations are coupled with potentially powerful damages provisions. 
See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An 
Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2010) (“[W]e identify the two economically 
crucial features of the current CPA [state consumer protection act] landscape: statutory provisions that 
offer enormous potential rewards to even dubious lawsuits that are likely brought to secure settlements;
and vague substantive standards of liability that the courts have interpreted so expansively that even the 
most straightforward and informative marketing practices can trigger potential CPA liability.”).
83. See Bruckner, supra note 2; Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-
authorities.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P2Y9-BBJX] (“Uber has long flouted laws and 
regulations to gain an edge against entrenched transportation providers, a modus operandi that has 
helped propel it into more than 70 countries and to a valuation close to $70 billion.”). 
84. See Peppet, supra note 75, at 148–160 (arguing in the context of consumer devices being 
developed to connect to the “Internet of Things,” that corporations should be given substantive guid-
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None of this is to say that such regulatory approaches will lead to per-
fectly efficient outcomes. There will remain significant risks of both over-
and under-deterrence of socially unproductive activity. But these approach-
es may allow the law to retain some relevance at least at the minimal 
bounds of permissible conduct, including simply by building some aware-
ness of existing legal protections among business actors whose prior expo-
sure to compliance norms may be minimal.
B. Regulatory Sandboxes, Experimentalism, and Stakeholder          
Participation
Several iterative and experimentalist regulatory approaches have been 
taken in the FinTech arena. These approaches emphasize stakeholder par-
ticipation in governance so that emerging concerns can be addressed quick-
ly and creatively. One promising approach to the regulation of FinTech has 
been to permit innovations to be tried out in protected “sandboxes.”
So-called regulatory sandboxes are notional realms created when 
regulators grant businesses specific permission to engage in real world test-
runs of innovative activities that might otherwise fall afoul of existing regu-
lations, often making direct contact with small groups of consumers or 
portions of markets.85 In a well-structured sandbox environment, both in-
dustry actors and regulators will be able to gather information concerning 
the potential costs and benefits of the tools being tested, so that an appro-
priate regulatory approach can be chosen by the regulators and appropriate 
internal controls developed by the businesses. Some regulators working in 
the “crowdfunding” area, for instance, have sought to permit small-scale 
crowdfunded corporate finance, to promote experimentation and technolog-
ical development in that arena while regulators in the United States work to 
ance regarding regulatory and consumer expectations at an early stage when it can most easily shape 
corporate behavior).
85. The scholarship on regulatory sandboxes seems to be still in its infancy. For basic accounts of 
these tools within the broader context of technology regulatory challenges, see, e.g., Mark Fenwick et 
al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law? 25-27 (Tilburg 
Univ. Law & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2016-024, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2834531[https://perma.cc/GM45-RLAV]; Poll-
man, supra note 76; HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS, HONG KONG LAUNCHES REGULATORY SANDBOX IN 
WAKE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, AND THE UK (2016),
http://sites.herbertsmithfreehills.vuturevx.com/103/12430/landing-pages/2016.09.30-apac-fintech-
briefing.pdf. [https://perma.cc/7DQJ-SRMS]. For an introduction to an actual sandbox, see FinTech 
Regulatory Sandbox, MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., http://www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-Financial-
Centre/Smart-Financial-Centre/FinTech-Regulatory-Sandbox.aspx [https://perma.cc/995M-KLG7]. For 
a reflection on the first year of one of the major regulatory sandbox efforts, see FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
REGULATORY SANDBOX LESSONS LEARNED REPORT (2017), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-lessons-learned-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JTE5-GXSE].
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settle on an appropriate regulatory framework.86 Without formally erecting 
a sandbox, the CFPB has begun pursuing a similar goal by using the tool of 
no-action letters. In September 2017, it issued a “no-action” letter to a 
FinTech startup called Upstart Network, Inc., promising temporary regula-
tory forbearance in exchange for compliance with certain guidelines includ-
ing the sharing of data concerning business practices and results.87
Sandboxes (and no-action letters of similar purpose) are an example of 
an “experimentalist” approach to governance.88 Experimentalist approaches 
are appropriate in policy areas “in which technological and economic 
change has outstripped the capacities of established market and bureaucrat-
ic safeguards to protect key public interests.”89 Experimentalist approaches 
emphasize exchange of information among stakeholders and regulators, 
iterative and dynamic regulatory processes, and the simultaneous develop-
ment of rules as well as the monitoring and enforcement structures to en-
force those rules.
Experimentalist approaches such as sandboxes carry drawbacks and 
risks, of course. Advance regulatory consent to, and supervision of, “sand-
boxes” is required, which adds public costs both up-front and in the form of 
ongoing monitoring, and which increases risk of regulatory capture.90 In
86. The efforts have received significant attention but not been deemed an unqualified success. 
For background and analysis of regulatory efforts, see Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic 
Justice, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 309 (2013) (critiquing the discriminatory effects of some U.S. 
regulatory efforts); Abbey Stemler, Equity-Based Crowdfunding: Allowing the Masses to Take a Slice 
of the Pie, in INT’L PERSPECTIVES ON CROWDFUNDING 219 (Jérôme Méric et al. eds., 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2767020 [https://perma.cc/DP8K-5XE8]; David 
Groshoff, Kickstarter My Heart: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowdfunding 
Constraints and Bitcoin Bubbles, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 489, 494 (2014) (“[T]his Article ad-
dresses the U.S. federal government’s apparent contradictory—and perhaps even delusional—behavior 
when comparing the over-regulation (only partly assuaged in the 2012 JOBS Act) in nascent capital 
formation platforms—popularly known as crowdfunding—with a near-stunning regulatory absence 
over decentralized convertible virtual crypto-currencies, the most common of which is presently 
Bitcoin.” (footnotes omitted)). Recent regulations have permitted limited equity securities issuance 
through crowdfunding. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 
30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [https://perma.cc/WSY5-H6U7].
87. See No-Action Letter from Christopher M. D’Angelo, Assoc. Dir. for Supervision, Enf’t & 
Fair Lending, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Thomas P. Brown, Paul Hastings, LLP (Sept. 14, 2017), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5K4K-7S5M]; Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Announces First 
No-Action Letter to Upstart Network (Sept. 14, 2017) (summarizing the scope of the relief) 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-announces-first-no-action-letter-upstart-
network/ [https://perma.cc/X6BK-9SPC]. 
88. For an introduction to experimentalist approaches, see Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Minimalism & Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 78–92 (2011).
89. Sabel & Simon, supra note 88, at 78.
90. See Pollman, supra note 76; Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/FBV4-PEKC] (“To conduct a 
regulated activity in the UK, a firm must be authorised or registered by us, unless certain exemptions 
apply.”).
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addition, because sandboxes are inevitably very limited in scope (in part 
due to the intense supervisory demands they put on regulators), sandboxes 
can provide only a partial view of how full market implementation of a 
given technology would go, and what further developments might arise as 
full-market efforts are undertaken. Nonetheless, regulatory sandboxes pro-
vide an initial opportunity for regulators or advocates to assess and gain 
experience in consumer protection issues arising in emerging business are-
as. Sandbox procedures can be specifically crafted to require that detailed 
data be made available on a real-time basis to regulators or consumer advo-
cates91 and to permit testing of potential consumer implications—testing, 
for instance, for unlawful discriminatory impacts.92
There are also steps that could be taken to include consumer perspec-
tives in lawmaking, for instance by encouraging ongoing participation by 
stakeholders in the regulatory process. The idea of stakeholder participation 
is not just to provide an arena for advocacy, but to gather information con-
cerning effects that regulators and other stakeholders may not be aware 
of.93
Consumer advocates have sought inclusion for consumer interests in 
the lawmaking process in several ways that seem relatively easy to imple-
ment. For example, when uniform law commissions and similar bodies 
consider regulation in areas that potentially impact consumers, meetings 
could be televised and remote participation permitted.94 Other ideas are the 
appointment of “public advisers” as used in some contexts for utility rate 
negotiations, and the preparation of reports on the anticipated effects of 
91. Some reporting is currently required from sandbox participants. See MONETARY AUTH. OF
SING., FINTECH REGULATORY SANDBOX GUIDELINES 6 (2016) (“The test scenarios and expected 
outcomes of the sandbox experimentation should be clearly defined, and the sandbox entity should 
report to MAS [the regulatory authority] on the test progress based on an agreed schedule.”), 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/Smart%20Financial%20Centre/Sandbox/FinTech%20Regulatory%20S
andbox%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW7R-49Z4]. But this apparently minimal and after-the-
fact reporting requirement falls below what is proposed here. With the proposed data and reporting 
requirements in place, sandboxes would thus operate as a form of what Wulf Kaal describes as “dynam-
ic regulation.” See Fenwick et al., supra note 85; Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation, in
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW, BUSINESS AND INNOVATION (Mark Fenwick et al. eds., 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040 [https://perma.cc/YLY3-YFDW]. Obviously, unless the data can be 
analyzed expeditiously, it isn’t worth gathering. Thus, the limits of regulatory capacity might limit the 
utility of this type of approach.
92. Such a requirement would be similar to the requirement, imposed pursuant to a regulatory 
settlement in a discrimination lawsuit, that the housing platform Airbnb permit special data and testing 
access to regulators. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
93. Sabel & Simon, supra note 88, at 82 (“Experimentalism emphasizes stakeholder participation 
to elicit and reconcile the diverse views and interests of people distinctively affected by and knowl-
edgeable about the matters in issue.”).
94. Gail Hillebrand, What’s Wrong With the Uniform Law Process?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 638–
43 (2000).
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legal changes on consumers similar to environmental impact assessments.95
Industry involvement in the regulatory process also merits emphasis in this 
arena, because start-ups and other non-incumbent actors may not be as 
adept as traditional industry actors at representing their interests before 
regulators and lawmakers (or at developing internal compliance norms). 
There are of course, again, risks of capture and expense of regulatory infra-
structure in this type of ongoing regulatory process.96
Another experimentalist approach might be to build in the likelihood 
of technological change and anticipate the obsolescence of certain laws. 
For instance, consider a law permitting merchants to keep records only for 
a limited amount of time, or provide only limited information to consum-
ers; such regulations may have represented a reasonable balance of costs 
and benefits as of the date of promulgation, but as data storage, retrieval, 
and communication become cheaper, the “balance” recognized by such 
laws will become quickly outdated.97 The use of legislative sunsets could 
force merchants either to return to seek renewal of legislation or encourage 
them simply to develop technology that makes legislation unnecessary.
Again, an advantage of what could be called a more “experimentalist” 
or iterative governance model as espoused in the preceding paragraphs is 
that it might elicit more collaboration or cooperation from industry. Alt-
hough capture—the tendency of regulators to take on the values of those 
regulated rather than those to be protected—remains a concern given the 
open experimentalist structure, the exchange of values can also travel the 
other direction: Industry actors unfamiliar with compliance norms or with 
considering public welfare may be influenced to begin including such con-
cerns in their decision-making processes. In areas where technology is 
quickly emerging and legal standards may be unclear at best, the influence 
95. Hillebrand, supra note 78, at 160–62 (promoting these proposals but acknowledging their 
limitations).
96. Brummer, supra note 76, at 1042 (“In a world of objectives-based processes . . . resources are 
needed for a sustained investment in the infrastructure to support additional supervisory and relation-
ship management personnel with firms, surveillance of market participants, and ongoing education 
programs to build more dialogic relationships with regulated actors.”).
97. Gail Hillebrand notes: 
Article 4 excuses banks from providing the name of the check payee regardless of how inex-
pensive it might to provide that information in the future. California and Washington placed a 
“sunset”—an automatic expiration-on this broad safe harbor. The New York Law Revision 
Commission has also recommended a “sunset” provision to prevent freezing in this minimal 
amount of information as all that will ever be required regardless of technological progress. 
Id. at 150–51. A similar example is the record keeping requirements of Regulation B of the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. § 1002.12(b) (2017), which could be automatically tightened up over 
time by a well-drafted law. See PORTER, supra note 36, at 140.
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of non-industry stakeholders at an early stage of business and technology 
development may lead to more successful integration of the public interest 
with FinTech business models. In other words, this may be a way of putting 
compliance and related public interest norms on the agenda of startups that 
may not otherwise attend to them.
C. Public Interest Innovation
Another step—not regulatory in nature but rather policy-oriented—
could be to foster consumer innovations in service of the public interest. 
This does not mean some sort of ideologically committed, government-
funded venture capital fund, although perhaps in some focused arenas that 
could be an appropriate strategy, for instance with respect to technology 
protecting vulnerable populations such as elders, who for economic reasons 
may be neglected by the products of for-profit enterprises.98
Rather, regulators, policymakers, and advocates should simply con-
ceive of their goals as including not just protection in the form of regulation 
but also development of technological tools that accomplish similar goals.99
This could include data technologies, such as those that collect and aggre-
gate complaints about merchants and credit providers, which is an im-
portant function that the CFPB has provided in the last few years,100 or that 
98. Consider for example technology designed to detect mental disabilities or using communica-
tion tools known to be effective with a particular vulnerable population. See PORTER, supra note 36, at 
28.
99. It bears noting that these “public interest” innovations will be just as susceptible to FinTech’s 
double edge as any other technological tools and may well lead to unforeseen consequences that will 
require further attention or intervention. Non-profits such as the Center for Financial Services Innova-
tion, which includes both public interest and industry leadership in its projects, might be one center for 
such efforts. See CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, cfsinnovation.org [https://perma.cc/3YM2-
LRLM].
100. The CFPB’s complaint function has drawn significant academic and industry (and political) 
attention. See generally Foohey, supra note 40, at 184; Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then 
and Now, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 895 (2015); Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the 
CFPB’s Complaint Mechanism, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57 (2012); Ian Ayres et al., Skele-
tons in the Database: An Early Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 343 (2014); Gretchen Morgenson, The Watchdog Protecting Consumers May Be Too Effective,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/business/consumer-financial-
protection-bureau-gretchen-morgenson.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/3GDF-J288] (“One of the C.F.P.B.’s 
best features is its unusual complaint process, in which it acts as intermediary between consumers who 
believe they have been wronged and the companies they have had problems with. . . . This system is the 
largest database of consumer finance complaints in the country, bureau officials say. Monthly reports 
analyzing the grievances received by the bureau are available on its website, providing a real-time 
snapshot of problems consumers are experiencing in their financial lives.”); David Lazarus, Revised 
GOP Bill Would Destroy the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, L.A. TIMES, (Apr. 18, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-gop-at-war-with-consumers-20170418-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/XD8H-LYQ4 ] (“[House Financial Services Committee Chair Rep. Jeb] Hensarling’s 
revised bill would completely do away with the bureau’s database of consumer complaints, which 
contains more than 700,000 searchable listings. The first version of his bill throttled the effectiveness of 
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allow for more easily comparisons of prices and terms for complex markets 
or products.101 It could include technologies that facilitate collective partic-
ipation and action. Social media is the easiest example. For instance, when 
a social media firestorm broke out about alleged racial discrimination on 
the housing platform AirBnb, it prompted regulatory attention and signifi-
cant changes in AirBnB’s business with the goal of hindering discrimina-
tion by hosts.102 It could include straightforward blocking technologies, like 
those that block pop-up advertisements within an Internet browser or those 
that restrict information gathered by websites visited.103
It could include other alternative, consumer-protective products.
There are numerous projects that could fit this bill.104 For instance, Profes-
sor Mehrsa Baradaran has proposed dealing with the problem of the “un-
banked” by providing free basic, reliable banking services in the form of 
postal banking105; online-only possibilities may be more likely if her par-
ticular proposals for relying on the existing postal infrastructure do not 
catch on.
the database by requiring that all complaints be ‘verified’ before being posted online. The new version 
simply says no consumer complaints can be publicly aired.”).
101. Van Loo, supra note 32 (discussing “digital intermediaries” as technological tools, and pro-
posing a legal framework for them). 
102. Elaine Glusac, As Airbnb Grows, So Do Claims of Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/travel/airbnb-discrimination-lawsuit.html 
[http://perma.cc/W8EN-MB78]. After reaching a settlement, “Airbnb will allow the government to test 
for racial discrimination by hosts as part of an agreement with California that is the first of its kind and 
could pave the way for stricter regulations and greater public scrutiny.” Sam Levin, Airbnb Gives in to 
Regulator’s Demand to Test for Racial Discrimination by Hosts, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2017, 8:02 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/27/airbnb-government-housing-test-black-
discrimination [https://perma.cc/5ZXD-MVFH]. The settlement with the California Department of Fair 
Employment and Housing is available at http://www.dfeh.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/32/2017/06/04-19-17-Airbnb-DFEH-Agreement-Signed-DFEH-1-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N4XB-9UNE].
103. See, e.g., Scott Gilbertson, Chrome Add-On Kills Tracking Cookies, WIRED (Jan. 25, 2011, 
12:28 PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/01/chrome-add-on-kills-tracking-cookies/ 
[http://perma.cc/4ZWY-GYJR]; Jia Tolentino, The Adorable Ads That Are About to Invade Your Text 
Messages, NEW YORKER (Nov. 26, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/jia-tolentino/the-
adorable-ads-that-are-about-to-invade-your-text-messages [http://perma.cc/YT2U-XVE3] (“These days, 
less than one per cent of Web readers click on an average banner ad; the advertising industry talks about 
fighting ‘banner blindness.’ Internet publishers have compensated by pumping out increasingly large 
volumes of content in order to obtain decreasing amounts of ad-click revenue. Ad-blocking programs 
drain billions of dollars from the industry . . . .”).
104. See, for example, CFPB’s Project Catalyst, whose “mission is to encourage consumer-
friendly innovation in markets for consumer financial products and services.” Project Catalyst,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/project-catalyst/ 
[https://perma.cc/SJ66-239Q]. See also Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Remedies: Ordering 
Firms to Eradicate Their Own Fraud, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (2017) (proposing reasons and 
mechanisms for “enlisting defendant firms [in consumer-protection cases] to eradicate the effects of 
their own fraud,” in part through technological means).
105. See generally MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS (2015).
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Frequently, ideas for improvement will require some mix of public 
and private action. To take an example of this, Professor Fairfield has pro-
posed ways in which consumers could be empowered by smart contracts 
and “consumer software agents,” which would permit consumers to pro-
gram their cyber-/robotic representative to “counter-propose” terms to 
commercial transactions with merchants.106 But as he notes, for this tech-
nology to work, the current law on “battles of the forms” would have to be 
altered.
These strategies would not necessarily involve high-tech research or 
the procurement of patents; rather they would largely involve what could 
be called “low-tech FinTech”: development of tools that meet some unmet 
social need but rely on existing, widely available technologies. The Con-
sumer Finance Protection Bureau’s complaint collection and analysis 
mechanism is an example of a tool that is not particularly technologically 
sophisticated but has been a successful tool for bringing change to business 
practices even without direct regulatory interventions such as rule-making 
or enforcement litigation.107
It bears noting that there may be reason for optimism about pro-
consumer market forces; technology lowers the cost of coordination, and 
for instance, if a developer can make an inexpensive app that people actual-
ly use, or can attract some consumer traffic to her website and build adver-
tising revenue, it might become more commercially feasible than in the 
past to make money from developing this type of technology.108 Perhaps, 
banks and other mainstream market participants might be interested in 
providing higher-quality services in competition with “alternative” loan 
providers—although in light of the Wells Fargo scandal we may be skepti-
cal of this hope.109
106. Fairfield, supra note 66, at 45.
107. Foohey, supra note 40, at 181 (discussing the “Yelp-like” function of the CFPB’s consumer 
finance complaint aggregation service). For a detailed, skeptical view of “digital intermediaries,” see 
Van Loo, supra note 32, at 1285.
108. Ryan Rigney, How to Make a No. 1 App with $99 and Three Hours of Work, WIRED (Mar. 5, 
2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/flappy-bird-clones/ [http://perma.cc/JP8U-JSWZ] 
(providing an account of the ease of creating a functional app with little programming skill); GOOGLE 
ADSENSE, https://www.google.com/adsense/start/#/?modal_active=none [https://perma.cc/T6QR-
ZER4] (“AdSense is a free, simple way to make money online by placing ads on your website.”); 3
Types of Sites That Have Quality AdSense Revenue, GOOGLE ADSENSE,
https://www.google.com/adsense/start/resources/quality-adsense-revenue.html#/ 
[https://perma.cc/FUR3-VPDY] (noting that blogs, forums, and free online tools are the types that 
typically “make the most money with Google AdSense”). 
109. Concerning the Wells Fargo scandal, see Hamilton, supra note 15; Cowley, supra note 15;
Arnold, supra note 15; Levine, supra note 15. It seems clear in this situation that Wells Fargo cared 
little about its reputation with consumers if it meant sacrificing revenue. Wells Fargo might not, of 
course, be representative, although other major institutions have had their own consumer-relations 
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The ideas given above are not only few in number but also stated in 
very general terms. Even if given more substance and then implemented 
they might well be inadequate to the problem. The proposals here are start-
ing-points only, and it is hoped that more ideas for policy responses to 
FinTech tools and their double edges may emerge as the issue draws more 
study. If that does not occur, traditional regulatory interventions may have 
to fill the gap, despite their various inadequacies—or protections may 
simply decline.
IV. ACCESS TO FINTECH AS ACCESS TO JUSTICE
FinTech has potential to serve numerous important social ends, among 
other things facilitating access to financial services, to consumer financial 
education and information, and to dispute resolution tools. But financial 
and cognitive barriers to FinTech remain.110 Accordingly, to the degree that 
FinTech tools are necessary to or protective of those engaging in transac-
tions, restricted access to FinTech may restrict access to markets, to finan-
cial services, and to the legal system. In other words, access to FinTech 
may be a part of access to justice.111
Although their use is widespread, smart phones remain expensive 
even on the resale market,112 and advances in the requirements of advanced 
software renders older hardware obsolete.113 Even after a device is pro-
cured, thoroughly integrating the use of a device into one’s financial life 
scandals. See, e.g., Bill Chappell, JPMorgan Chase Will Pay $13 Billion in Record Settlement, NPR
(Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/11/19/246143595/j-p-morgan-chase-
will-pay-13-billion-in-record-settlement [https://perma.cc/UK92-J6U6] (providing description of set-
tlements and fines by J.P. Morgan Chase totaling to more than $20 billion in 2013). 
110. Concerning this “digital divide” in the financial arena, see, e.g., WU & SANDERS, supra note 
35, at 2–6; LISA J. SERVON, BRIDGING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: TECHNOLOGY, COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (2002); Neil Selwyn, Reconsidering Political and Popular Understandings of the Digital 
Divide, 6 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 341 (2004).
111. Mark Lloyd, The Digital Divide and Equal Access to Justice, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 505, 506 (2002) (“Will the problems of equal justice be exacerbated by unequal access to technolo-
gy?”). In this respect, traditional “access to justice” efforts within the legal industry may provide some 
models for ensuring wide access to technology. See, e.g., Gabrielle Orum Hernandez, Access to Justice
Tech Leaders Have a Few Lessons for Their Corporate Counterparts, INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 24, 2017), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2017/02/24/access-to-justice-tech-leaders-have-a-few-lessons?ref=nav 
[https://perma.cc/VX5Q-P4TD].
112. One reputable technology resale site, Gazelle, sells a baseline certified used iPhone 5s (origi-
nally released in 2013), for use on AT&T’s network, for $99. See Certified Used iPhone 5s – 16GB 
Unlocked, GAZELLE, https://buy.gazelle.com/buy/used/iphone-5s-16gb-unlocked 
[https://perma.cc/2EGX-2BF9]. 
113. For an explanation of the ways in which smart phones become obsolete, and whether such 
obsolescence is intentional or incidental in the development of new products, see Catherine Rampell, 
Planned Obsolescence, as Myth or Reality, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Oct. 31, 2013, 1:00 PM), 
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/planned-obsolescence-as-myth-or-reality/?mcubz=1 
[https://perma.cc/4EMH-NUEU].
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requires reliable and secure access to the Internet either through a cellular 
service plan114 or through an Internet connection115 (which even if obtained 
freely in a public location such as a library116 requires transportation and 
ample time to access). Thus even “free” email accounts, such as those 
available from Google,117 may serve little purpose without such access to 
hardware and to an Internet connection.
The cognitive demands of using FinTech may also represent an access 
barrier to many would-be users.118 Users who by reason of age or educa-
tional background are not true “digital natives” may struggle to select ap-
propriate tools, to avoid being taken advantage of by scams, to recognize 
reliable sources of information, to take appropriate security steps, to moni-
tor accounts and transactions, and to pursue and resolve claims or disputes 
online and through technological means.119
For users whose access to FinTech is limited by any of the factors dis-
cussed above, its advent may be a loss without much corresponding gain. 
Financial opportunities that might have been available before might now be 
denied to them as a result of their lack of access. In the same way that the 
“unbanked” or “un-credit-carded” lost out as credit providers increasingly 
114. A current AT&T data-only plan for smart phones (1 gigabyte per month high speed, the rest 
at a much slower rate) appears to run at least $30 per month, not including phone or text messaging 
service, or taxes and fees. See Family Plans—Mobile Share Advantage, AT&T, 
https://www.att.com/shop/wireless/data-plans.html [https://perma.cc/V8FM-3N4N].
115. Lee Rainie & D’Vera Cohn, Census: Computer Ownership, Internet Connection Varies 
Widely Across U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/09/19/census-computer-ownership-internet-connection-varies-widely-across-u-s/ 
[https://perma.cc/9F77-35U4].
116. Stephan Barker, Opinion, Libraries Help Close the Digital Divide, WASH. POST (May 1,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/libraries-help-close-the-digital-
divide/2015/05/01/bd6d6e84-edef-11e4-8abc-d6aa3bad79dd_story.html?utm_term=.4ac9b057c0a9 
[https://perma.cc/HEE9-QF6W].
117. See GMAIL, https://www.google.com/gmail/about/ [https://perma.cc/AY7J-JH3N].
118. See generally Amy Gonzales, The Contemporary US Digital Divide: From Initial Access to 
Technology Maintenance, 19 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 234 (2016); Ellen Johanna Helsper & Alexander 
J.A.M. van Deursen, Digital Skills in Europe: Research and Policy, in DIGITAL DIVIDES: THE NEW
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF E-INCLUSION 125–148 (Kim Andreasson ed., 2015).
119. To take one recent and prominent example,”[h]ackers accused of working for Russian intelli-
gence breached the Gmail account of John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s campaign, using 
an old-fashioned technique called ‘spear-phishing’: sending an e-mail under false pretenses to garner 
personal information, such as a password.” Evan Osnos, How Not to Freak Out About Cyber War, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-not-to-freak-out-
about-cyber [http://perma.cc/7VZQ-MCUF]. “Even Mr. Podesta, a savvy Washington insider who had 
written a 2014 report on cyberprivacy for President Obama, did not truly understand the gravity of the 
hacking.” Eric Lipton et al., The Perfect Weapon, How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-
dnc.html?mcubz=1 [http://perma.cc/E4AG-3E5A]. In fact the attack fooled not Podesta directly as an 
initial matter but the IT specialist tasked with reviewing his emails. “‘This is a legitimate email,’ 
Charles Delavan, a Clinton campaign aide, replied to another of Mr. Podesta’s aides, who had noticed 
the alert.” Id. Delavan has subsequently claimed that this was a typo and he actually was not fooled. Id.
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relied on credit scoring for loan underwriting, those without the appropriate 
online “presence” may suffer if online profiles and activities become stand-
ards by which creditworthiness is judged.120
Even government services may be restricted, as agencies rely on 
online interfaces rather than staffed offices.121 While of course online inter-
faces may be superior in all sorts of ways for the bulk of users, if they 
crowd out other existing alternatives, there will be distributive consequenc-
es. Identification of this problem by policymakers may be difficult because 
“FinTech creep” along these lines may occur gradually and thus be imper-
ceptible (to all but those most affected).
Any consumer-protective FinTech work must include consideration of 
the distributive consequences of widespread reliance on FinTech. This is 
true because consumer protection laws are largely justified by reference to 
distributive goals and to the features of bounded rationality that consumers 
are known are thought to suffer from but which themselves are not evenly 
distributed in the population.122
Finally, “consumer” protective steps should not be thought of too nar-
rowly, as affecting only individuals engaging in activities relating solely to 
their households. Small business, sole proprietors, and the increasingly 
broad category of “independent contractors,”123 may all merit protections 
for the same reasons traditionally given for those meeting the standard 
definitions of “consumers,”124 in that they may lack some of the cognitive 
or financial ability to participate on equal footing with other market partici-
pants and may therefore require regulatory interventions to be made on 
their behalf.
120. See Odinet, supra note 18; BARADARAN, supra note 105.
121. See, e.g., Janice C. Sipior & Burke T. Ward, Bridging the Digital Divide for e-Government 
Inclusion: A United States Case Study, 3 ELEC. J. E-GOV’T 137 (2005), 
www.ejeg.com/issue/download.html?idArticle=52 [https://perma.cc/H98G-29W2]; Antoine Harfouche, 
The Same Wine but in New Bottles. Public E-Services Divide and Low Citizens’ Satisfaction: An Exam-
ple from Lebanon, in TECHNOLOGY ENABLED TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR: ADVANCES 
IN E-GOVERNMENT 267 (Vishanth Weerakkody ed., 2012).
122. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 31; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Richard M. Hynes & Eric A. Pos-
ner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168 (2002).
123. See, e.g., PORTER, supra note 36, at 25.
124. “Consumer protection appropriately also applies to what I call ‘quasi consumers’—sole 
proprietorships and small businesses without the sophistication and resources to use legal counsel 
regularly.” Braucher, supra note 78, at 558 (citing Jean Braucher, Politics and Principle in the Drafting 
of UCC Consumer Protection Provisions, 29 UCC L.J. 68, 78 (1996)).
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CONCLUSION
FinTech tools are already pervasive in virtually every aspect of com-
merce life, both for businesses and for individuals. These tools have un-
questionably lowered transactions costs to the benefit of all, and also have 
all sorts of other unpredictable effects. Their development is also unpre-
dictable (depending on not just technological but also a wide range of so-
cial dynamics), and path-dependent (if they are restricted in one way, 
further developments along that line will be blocked). Abuses may be over-
looked if blind optimism concerning a technological tool holds sway—or 
innovations may be stifled if distrust dominates instead. Confident, ex ante 
determination of the uses to which technologies may be put is simply not 
possible. The task of policy makers is to permit technological development 
to be as free as possible while restraining fraudulent, anti-competitive, or 
consumer-abusive uses of those tools.
In light of these realities, this essay has proposed several approaches 
that may hold some promise at regulating and enabling FinTech: the use of 
purposive and compliance-driven regulatory frameworks; regulatory 
“sandboxes” and other experimentalist and stakeholder-participatory ap-
proaches to FinTech governance; and the development of consumer-
protective and consumer-enabling FinTech as an alternative to legal regula-
tory tools.
The essay has also drawn attention to the fact that the benefits and 
dangers of FinTech are not evenly distributed and that as FinTech tools are 
used to organize even the most basic commercial relationships, access to 
such technology may implicated access to markets, to financial services, 
and to the judicial system. As such, enabling fair and broad access to such 
tools may well become a policy imperative.
